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The human element should be defined as the combination of individual and inherent professional (flight), contingent on the whole the qualities and characteristics of man, which manifest themselves in specific modalities of operation of the aviation system, affecting its efficiency and reliability (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2010).
Earlier the process of human interaction with the aircraft was provided by the pilot, mostly by simple motor reactions, but currently he works with the complex information model, and his activity is dominated by the intellectual and emotional components. It very important to focus here on the fact that man cannot compensate for what is limited by his nature (Harris & Muir, 2005).
The problem of human element in aviation safety, thus, emerged from the mismatch of abilities of the human operator to requirements set for him in the management of modern aircraft. The problem of the human element in aviation accidents every year gets increasingly broad recognition by international community as the highest priority one.
At the European conference organized by the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) and the European association of regional airlines, held in Geneva, the recurring theme was the problem of the human element (Masys, 2004).
The causes of accidents and their preconditions can be divided into three main groups: relating to the technological failures, to environmental factors and to the “guilt” of the human element (Masys, 2004).
It is known that the greatest number of aircraft accidents and disasters is associated with mistakes in the actions of the crews of aircraft – over 80% of the total number of aircraft accidents. They are due to the violation of the rules of flight, as well as mistakes in the actions of professional ground services, which came into aviation terminology under the name “the problem of human factor” (Langan-Fox, Sankey, & Canty, 2009).
Of course, the truth is unknown. But the sum of the knowledge of each is the truth. Everything, what is reported at the FSF conferences by the best aviation specialists of the world, is entered into the data bank of the fund. And then it is used in practical activities of national civil aviation administrations and in many cases by ICAO.
By today, the aviation sphere has developed two mutually exclusive approaches to the perception and explanation of this significantly complicated problem. The first is obviously accusing one, in which the determination of an erroneous action is considered the end of the investigation, and the crew or pilot who made the mistake is considered to be guilty, with all the consequences that come with it.
The second approach is based on a systematic methodology. Under this approach, the error in the actions of the crew appears not a finishing, but the starting point of the investigation, which reveals the totality of relationships and interactions, from which derive the causal relationships of unfavorable development and outcome of the emergency situation of the flight. Moreover, it is originally assumed that the cause must be sought not so much in the crew, as in all elements of the aviation system (Sarter, 2008).
On the one side of the problem are the official representatives of civil aviation, and on the other side are the representatives of crews and their supporters, rather consistently supported by the industry science, who strongly disagree with such an assessment of the problem. Undoubtedly, the modern aviation practice is sufficiently rich in examples of unprofessional actions of the crew. But is everything so clear?